1

Constructing a Price Deflator for R&D: Calculating the Price of Knowledge Investments as a Residual
"The value of an idea lies in the using of it." Thomas Alva Edison
International guidelines (SNA 2008) call for capitalizing R&D in national accounting systems, a welcome move, but one that raises vexing measurement issues. A major issue-perhaps the major issue at this point-is how to construct a price deflator for R&D. Currently there are quite a few candidates: (1) R&D often is equated with knowledge production, and an education deflator could be used. (2) Science policy analysts long have used the GDP deflator to deflate R&D, and national accountants could continue and enrich that practice. (3) National accountants could regard R&D as they regard other -hard to measure‖ outputs and use an input cost deflator, perhaps adjusted for productivity. (4) Finally, given the development of the R&D marketplace via the licensing of patents and the like, national accountants could obtain a price deflator by dividing revenue in the R&D marketplace by a quantity index of patents or scientists.
This paper sets out a framework that can be used to discuss and evaluate alternative price measures for knowledge investment; the framework is then used to construct a price index for private R&D in the United Kingdom from 1985 to 2005. The model and framework we develop is applicable to commercial knowledge investments more generally (i.e., investments in intangible assets as in Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel 2009 , and Marrano, Haskel, and Wallis 2009 , Corrado and Hulten 2010 and to measuring R&D price indexes for other countries.
The Edison quote above captures the basic notion behind the models and price estimates reported in this paper. We argue the four candidates can be reduced to two basic approaches: one we call the -upstream‖ approach in that it attempts to model and measure the knowledge production process itself, and the other we call the -downstream‖ approach that-in the spirit of the Edison quote-infers the price of knowledge investment from the fruits of the innovation process, total factor productivity (TFP).
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Innovation arguably is a routine function within business these days (Baumol 2002) . For some ongoing, existing firms, the business function devoted to innovation is explicit as the R&D or marketing or development department. In others, the function is less centralized or based on employee time, as in CEO Eric Schmidt's famous 80/20 rule at Google. 1 For entrepreneurial start-up businesses, almost by definition, high fractions of activity are devoted to innovation, broadly defined. Accordingly, we model aggregate business output as emanating from two sectors: one, the aggregate behavior of business functions devoted to innovation and R&D, and the other, an operations and/or producing sector consisting of all other business functions.
In the first use of the model, we show how the price of the commercially-produced knowledge is related to measured output prices, factor costs, and productivity in the operations sector. We compare and contrast this -downstream‖ approach to the -upstream‖ approach typically favored by statistical agencies, and we relate both approaches to the endogenous growth model of Romer (1990) in which markups of self-produced knowledge capital play a critical role. After considering how key aspects of innovation types (e.g., breakthrough vs. incremental innovations) and imperfect competition (e.g., markups) impact the modeling and measurement of output prices for innovation, we conclude such prices are implicitly in measured downstream sector productivity, that is, the value of resources devoted to innovative activity can be inferred from their use in business operations.
Because productivity as conventionally measured includes a contribution from the innovation sector, the second use of our model frames how to tease this contribution out of standard productivity data. Of course, conventional wisdom is that all sustained increases in TFP are due to innovation because of spillover effects. 3 And even though data constrain us to concentrate on estimating a price index for commercial R&D investments (rather than all investments in innovation), we still find that a substantial fraction of observed productivity change in the UK market sector emanates from its conduct of R&D. We obtain this result by exploiting the recursive nature of our model and the heterogeneity in R&D intensity by industry. The result impacts the estimated investment price index for UK R&D, the central estimate of which falls 7.5 percent per year from 1985 to 2005.
Our falling price index reflects both the success of industrial R&D (including spillovers) and the impact of innovations in the R&D process itself. Indeed, available evidence suggests technical progress in the -production of innovation‖ has been substantial. Consider how computerenabled combinatorial chemistry has drastically lowered the costs of pharmaceutical experimentation, how computer-aided design has lowered product development times for items such as semiconductors, motor vehicles-even the British Museum's tessellated glass ceilingand how the Internet has promoted academic collaboration and productivity (Adams, Black, Clemmons, and Stephan 2005; Ding, Levin, Stephan, and Winkler 2010) and made huge amounts of information available more or less for free.
Why is our finding of a falling price index for R&D of interest? Many advanced industrialized countries are concerned by the stagnation of their nation's R&D spending in relation to their GDP. But if the real price of R&D relative to GDP is falling, information in nominal terms is a misleading indicator. As we show below, with our new price index, the contribution of R&D capital deepening to the growth in output per hour in the UK remains substantial even though nominal R&D spending relative to GDP is flat/falling. This paper proceeds as follows: In the next section, we set out the model and show how it can be used to infer the unknown price of commercial knowledge investments using two approaches.
We then consider a host of theoretical and practical issues that confront the empirical application of each approach, and finally we turn to measurement and conclude.
more right than wrong. The view is an important element of the approach used to develop an innovation index for the UK ).
Theoretical Framework
This section sets out a theoretical framework that can be used to discuss and evaluate alternative price measures for commercial knowledge investments such as R&D. We start with a very simple model to show the main arguments of our approach and how it compares with other methods. We then explore the robustness of the model and approach to relaxing certain assumptions.
The model
We posit a market economy with two sectors-knowledge-producing and knowledge-usingand three factors of production-labor, capital, and knowledge. The knowledge-producing (or upstream) sector generates new knowledge () N using service flows from labor () N L , capital
, and a stock of existing knowledge, denoted N R .
The stock of existing knowledge is superscripted by N because the knowledge used in the producing sector is assumed to be different from that in the using (or downstream) sector.
Although we elaborate more fully on this assumption below, a simple way of thinking about the distinction is to suppose that the upstream sector uses -basic‖ or -unfinished‖ knowledge and transforms it into commercialised or -finished‖ knowledge. The finished knowledge is then employed in the production of goods and services by the downstream sector. We further assume that all basic knowledge is free, from universities say, and determined outside the model. In a subsequent section we relax some of these assumptions.
The production function for the upstream industry and corresponding accounting equation for factor payments is written as follows: ( , , , ) ;
where N is newly-produced appropriable knowledge and L P and K P are prices per unit of labor and capital input, respectively. There are no payments to N R because its services are free. which is assumed to grow with the production of N via the perpetual inventory model:
The term R  is the rate of decay of appropriable revenues from the conduct of commercial knowledge production.
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The production function and flow equations in the downstream sector are ( , , , ) ;
where R P is the price of renting a unit of the finished knowledge stock (e.g., a license fee for a patent or blueprint). The relationship between N P , the price of a unit of newly-produced finished knowledge (an investment or asset price) and the price of renting a unit of the same knowledge is given by the user cost relation
where N  is the real rate of return in sector N and taxes are ignored. Recalling that sector Y includes the production of investment goods I , equations similar to (2) and (4) for tangible capital but expressed in terms of , , , , and

(instead of , , , , and
complete the model.
We are now in a position to understand two broad approaches, upstream and downstream, to modelling R&D prices. Log differentiation of the income flow equations and dropping time subscripts gives the following price duals:
The -s‖ terms are factor income shares for labor, capital, and knowledge calculated for each sector in the usual way from equations (1) are the change in total factor productivity for each sector, i.e., the shift in each sector's production function. The interpretation of the sector productivities and their relationship to aggregate productivity for the economy as a whole is discussed in a subsequent section.
Upstream method: data from the R&D-performing sector
Consider equation (5). Most statistical agencies have survey data on the R&D business function of R&D-performing firms; thus, existing surveys give us information on the first two terms in equation (5). But equation (5) also shows that productivity in the R&D sector ln N TFP  is needed to estimate prices for R&D, and information on this quantity is very scant indeed.
Economists long have studied the impact of R&D on productivity, but quantitative studies of productivity in the R&D process itself are fairly rare. Studies of the impact of the Internet were mentioned previously. Agrawal and Gort (2001) show that product development times shortened steadily from 1887 to 1985, suggesting improvements in R&D productivity are somewhat of a norm. And Mokyr (2007 Mokyr ( , p. 1154 states -In the past, the practical difficulty of solving differential equations limited the application of theoretical models to engineering. A clever physicist, it has been said, is somebody who can rearrange the parameters of an insoluble equation so that it does not have to be solved. Computer simulation can evade that difficulty and help us see relations in the absence of exact closed-form solutions ... In recent years simulation models have been extended to include the effects of chemical compounds on human bodies.
Combinatorial chemistry and molecular biology are both equally unimaginable without fast computers.‖ The upstream approach is the dominant approach used by statistical agencies. 5 In its most basic form, the method assumes, in (5), that ln 0 N TFP  and uses only share-weighted input costs to measure output price change. This variant has been used by both the UK Office of National Statistics (ONS) and US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) to approach the measurement of 7 R&D prices, e.g. Galindo-Rueda (2007) and one of the approaches reported in Copeland, Medeiros and Robbins (2007) . 6 A more refined variant, referred to in Fixler (2009) 
As practical matter we also note that the result partly rests on the assumption that output per worker is unchanged over time, an assumption that is difficult to accept for a technology-intensive activity such as R&D. To improve the validity of the Copeland-Fixler approach, it may be worthwhile adjusting the number of workers for changes in composition (or -quality‖) via marginal-product weighting. 8 hurdles to be crossed in working with data from the IPR marketplace. Indeed, existing revenue data for the R&D services industry are likely confounded by these same issues.
Downstream method: data from the R&D-using sector
An alternative approach is to consider the downstream or R&D-using sector. Manipulation of equation (6) shows that it can be re-written as:
which says that the unknown ln In practice, we have many R&D-using industries. If R&D were a homogeneous good, the price from any one of them will do or one might combine prices from a number of downstream industries together to give a -grand‖ index, 
where there are J R&D-using industries; each industry is indexed by i ; and i  is a weight to be determined.
In its most general form, the downstream approach infers R&D prices from output prices (such as GDP prices) and is the most common approach used in analyzing R&D data for science policy analysis. It is a method that follows the Edison logic. Moreover, a specific approach in Copeland, Medeiros, and Robbins (2007) is an even closer cousin of equation (8) In terms of the salient drivers established in the productivity literature, our model views the distinction between the sectoral productivities as follows: Upstream productivity includes the appropriated returns to R&D, spillovers from public R&D, and the efficacy of the overall R&D process, whereas downstream productivity includes spillovers from freely available commercial knowledge (i.e., diffusion), as well as phenomena we associate with operations efficiency (e.g., economies of scale and services delivery improvements, etc.) that are unrelated to R&D.
Theoretical issues
This paper uses the downstream method. The simple model of the previous section has been designed to set out the broad intuition of the approach and illustrate its relation to other recent work. To carry on with the application requires reviewing a number of practical theoretical issues to which we now turn.
Use of knowledge in each sector
How robust is our assumption that the Second, one might extend the model and assume that the N sector also uses -finished‖ knowledge, as an input for example into producing more finished knowledge. But then the problem arises of how to define the total stock of finished knowledge when both sectors draw from it. We cannot define each sector as renting from the entire pool of knowledge, because then we would implicitly be allowing the same knowledge to be -rented twice‖ which results in an overstatement. Although some studies suggest very large private returns to R&D, still others suggest little more than competitive returns when consideration also is given to measuring the rate of decline in the value of the underlying R&D asset, i.e., the rate of depreciation in (2).
We have already assumed that knowledge is partially nonrival. A useful direction at this point therefore is to think about how we pay, for example, for Microsoft Office and how we might each year). In this case, the one-year leasing of a version does not generate any lasting asset held in the Y sector and so these payments are intermediates (just as payments by a cinema owner who rents a film to show for a month are treated as intermediates rather than rentals to the knowledge capital in the film industry).
But this does not necessarily mean that there is no stock of appropriable knowledge, or that there are just intermediate payments that net out. Rather we can think of the upstream sector as retaining ownership of the knowledge asset in its -inventory‖ or -product platform portfolio.‖
As an asset, the platform both earns a return (say at the rate knowledge asset is not being -rented twice‖ and the aggregate payment to R remains as given by equation (4). This argument could be made more formal, but the logic is simple: The N sector must implicitly pay something (to itself) to rent the knowledge in its platform in order to have the resources to create version after version. Equivalently, the N sector cannot charge the full rental equivalence suggested by (4) for versions because the full knowledge capital inheres in the platform, and only partially in the versions.
Market power in the upstream sector
This issue was considered by Romer (1990) , who assumed innovators practiced monopoly pricing. Our model is similar to his: he has three sectors. The ideas sector uses all knowledge in the economy freely as an input into ideas. Those ideas are then converted by the design sector into blueprints, knowledge which is appropriable and sold at a monopoly price to the production sector that uses blueprints as an intermediate good. Thus in our model it is the upstream, or innovation/R&D sector that can be thought of as the design sector who produces blueprints; in our language, they produce finished ideas that can be used in the output sector. Thus designs are rival and appropriable (at least for a time), and they are sold at the monopoly price to the production sector. Romer notes the -design‖ sector can of course be in-house. Copeland and Fixler (2009) also state that uncertainty and market power are endemic in the research sector, by which they mean that although there is a correlation between the output and input prices of R&D, this relationship is highly non-linear and it is not possible to establish a linear approximation of R&D prices using input costs (see their Appendix B). As a concrete example, Copeland and Fixler follow Romer and model the innovator as a monopolistic competitor with respect to other innovators, which suggests the output price is above marginal production cost. In Romer the innovator's price is given by P MC   , where MC is the marginal cost of producing a new good and is the markup, a function of the good's price elasticity of demand (Romer 1990 , un-numbered equations at the top of page S87).
Romer goes on to formulate the intertemporal zero-profit constraint, whose solution equates the instantaneous excess of revenue over marginal production cost as just sufficient to cover the interest cost of the innovation investment (equations 6 and 6', page S87). How does this result relate to the framework in this paper? Let us follow Romer and assume that product market power is located in the upstream sector. 9 In other words, the downstream sector, which uses the innovation, is competitive while the upstream sector, which produces the innovation, is a (temporary) monopolist. Under these assumptions, in our model, downstream producers are price-takers for knowledge.
If downstream marginal production costs are expressed as competitive payments to the usual factors of production and YY LK , then final output prices are indeed marked up over such costsbut not necessarily because of imperfect competition. Denoting the competitive factor costs of
C is the weighted-average cost of the usual inputs per unit of final output, then the producer markup in our model is expressed as
with the markup given by
In this way, section 1's expressions for downstream factor payments (3) and price dual (6) still hold. We show this by moving from the producer markup relation given by (10) to the downstream factor payments identity as follows:
This result establishes consistency of our framework with models of imperfect competition with producer markups and intertemporal zero profits, e.g., the equilibrium model of Rotemberg and Woodford (1995 
Market power in the downstream sector
Suppose there is market power in the downstream sector as well. Recalling that ln
represents the contribution of knowledge that is freely available to all competitors, a shorthand for considering imperfect competition is to modify this term in equation (6). As written, changes in TFP pass through one-for-one to changes in output prices. If factor prices are exogenous, this is consistent with a competitive model of process innovations whereby any process innovator immediately lowers her output prices to undercut rivals, and the competitive equilibrium is that all such TFP changes are passed through 100 percent.
A simple way to represent imperfect competition in the downstream industry is to pre-multiply R&D monopolist users appropriate all returns to process R&D (productivity gains) via pricing power.
In our discussion of equation (8) in section 1.3, we indicated that BEA has made use of a downstream method, but that an implicit assumption that factor costs and TFP net to zero was made via calculating an R&D price index as equation (9). Equation (12) suggests another way of thinking about the BEA index, namely, that the implicit netting may also reflect an implicit assumption about the degree of downstream monopoly power.
Product quality
Upstream production also leads to product-quality innovation in the downstream sector. If final output prices are not quality-adjusted, the true model written in terms of the quality adjustedprice,
, is as follows:
where true productivity change
has been calculated using quality-adjusted prices.
Equation (13) 
Equation (14) says that the measurement error from not quality-adjusting ln 
Sector productivities and markups in the steady state
The foregoing places imperfect competition in the upstream sector. We now explore the relationships among the sector productivities ln and ln Let the innovator markup over (competitive) upstream factor costs be given by 1
Continuing with the simplified notation of 2.2, the value of upstream output then becomes
where NN CF is the cost of the conduct of innovation/R&D in terms of the standard factors of production (labor and tangible capital) at competitive factor prices ()
Changes in the price and quantity elements of NN CF refer to the per unit share-weighted input costs and share-weighted input quantities denoted as ln
Upstream productivity is then given by:
and downstream sector productivity is given by
The upstream price dual now becomes ln ln
whereas the downstream sector's factor payments and price dual remain as given in section 1.
How do innovator markups and sector productivities relate to (a) our previous discussion of the Romer model, (b) the literature on intangible capital that would include R&D co-investments in N PN and (c) actual measured productivity growth in an economy? First, equation (17) follows from our earlier argument that treating inputs to innovation as investment produces a Romerstyle framework in which revenue from the production of final output must be sufficient to cover the -interest costs‖ of innovation. These costs subtract from productivity as per equation (17) because they are, in fact, forgone final output.
Second, theoretical models that incorporate markups usually follow Romer and impose intertemporal zero profits by setting the markup to one in steady-state equilibrium (e.g., Rotemberg and Woodford 1995) . The structure of our model also is consistent with using the 10 The similarly defined magnitudes for the final output sector and the total economy are 
Thus  must be added to the change in (upstream) factor inputs valued at competitive factor prices to capture the full costs of the R&D -overhead‖ borne by the downstream sector.
Under steady-state conditions the growth rate of a capital stock is well approximated by the growth rate of real investment (Griliches 1980) . Let g be such a growth rate for real R&D investment and its stock. As g approaches the real interest rate ρ N , the investment share approaches the capital income share (Jorgenson 1966) , i.e., we can write
where  is a discrete-time version of the Griliches (1980) term that converts gross investment to income from accumulated net investments:
The term approaches one in the N g   -maximal consumption‖ steady state.
11 A rationale for this interpretation is that the R&D data only cover costs of pursuing new scientific and engineering knowledge, and a -successful‖ R&D outcome (a patent, say) does not necessarily imply immediate business viability, much less costless implementation. Many new product development costs are not captured in the available R&D data because they are associated with activities considered to lack sufficient experimentation to be classified as R&D but are nonetheless an inseparable aspect of the -value‖ of R&D. 
where
, which goes to zero as  approaches one.
Rearranging terms in the last line of equation (21) yields
which depicts an economy's measured productivity growth as an (approximate) Domar-weighted average (Domar 1961; Hulten 1978) of the productivities in its innovation and final output sectors. The equation highlights our modelling of the knowledge production process (not just R&D spending) as an augmenter of final output productivity. Augmentation depends on R&D spending and the productivity or -success‖ of the R&D activity.
Measurement
Our approach is to formulate the empirical growth accounting counterpart to the theoretical model of the previous sections and then construct the terms on the right hand side of equation (8) to estimate price change for private R&D. For this we need estimates of input shares and final output productivity that account appropriately for the contribution of R&D to economic growth.
We cannot use the usual growth accounting terms because they are biased. We thus face three is the R&D intensity calculated using the cost data available from R&D surveys.
We further note that values for the parameters and  permit calculation of the producer markup of equation (10) . Of course, the effects discerned by this regression will be only those due to differences in resources allocated to R&D, on average, in the period of estimation.
Consequently, the regression is best implemented as a long-run relationship, i.e., as a quest for underlying trends in the two unobservable sector productivities, ln 12 Producer markups so defined are still related to the price elasticity of demand for the underlying goods as in Romer-indeed, our model connects expenditures on innovation to customer demand in this way. This is because when investments in innovation lead to products or brands with a high own-price elasticity of demand (think new Apple products vs. new brands of milk), -market power‖ and expenses devoted to developing and marketing new products become associated with one another and vice versa. is constant across industries (plus an error). Determining productivity differences across industries is problematic, of course-indeed, a topic afield from the central purpose of this paper. Accordingly, to pursue the upstream/downstream decomposition of productivity, we continue with the simple logic of equation (24), that downstream productivity trends are constant across industries.
Second, to capture long run relationships we might use data averaged over a long period but this gives us rather few observations. An alternative to gain more observations would be to break the data into productivity episodes that, presumably, are roughly equal in terms of productivity growth. There is of course a tension here, because the underlying relationships might be evolving over time, in which case additional controls will be needed to capture the appropriate trends.
Third, the analysis must confront the fact that the conduct of R&D is concentrated in a handful of industries, i.e., that measured R&D must be but one aspect of innovation's contribution to economic growth. Beyond the presence of R&D co-investments, in many advanced industrialized countries, large services industries (finance, distribution) contribute notably to economic growth but perform very little science-based R&D. Modeling all industries using equation (24) may therefore prove problematic. A related issue is that productivity growth for certain industries is poorly measured and including these observations may distort a regression's coefficient estimates.
Finally, we need values for and  to implement the regression. We are willing to employ the -maximal consumption‖ (i.e., 1   ) steady state assumption because the UK and many other advanced industrialized economies generally have stable industry-level R&D intensities. But using the Romer zero intertemporal innovator profits (i.e., 1   ) assumption is problematic because single productivity episodes do not necessarily correspond to periods of zero innovator profits.
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We therefore introduce a very practical reason for setting µ greater than one, namely, that the parameter places in-house R&D on the same footing with marketed R&D services. The costs of R&D exchanged between R&D establishments classified in a different industry than the parent/owner firm were in fact -marked up‖ in the US R&D satellite account for this reason (Moylan and Robbins 2007, p.52) . A related strategy is to use µ as a R&D co-investment multiple (see earlier discussion and footnote 11).
Following Moylan/Robbins a markup margin can be obtained using the ratio of net operating surplus to gross output for the miscellaneous professional, scientific, and technical services industry; we estimate this ratio averages about .15 in the United States (implying an average innovator markup of 1.15). Hulten and Hao (2008) studied six multinational pharmaceutical firms and estimated that the -shadow‖ value of own-produced pharmaceutical R&D was 50 percent greater than its cost (i.e., the innovator markup was 1.5) in the year they studied (2006). They also estimated that the increment to organizational capital was 30 percent of the value of own-produced R&D (i.e., the R&D co-investment multiple is 1.3).
Although the Hulten/Hao results suggest that in some years some industries have large markups, we proceed by applying the same markup to all industries in all years. We therefore use 1.15 as our central estimate for µ-the value needed to put in-house R&D on the same footing with marketed R&D services-but examine results for higher values in light of Hulten/Hao.
A productivity decomposition for the UK
We constructed an industry dataset that integrates gross output-based TFP estimates with R&D Notes-TFP growth rates are estimated using the dual approach, and all growth rates are calculated using log differences. Aggregation in lines 1-3 is over 29 market sector industries excluding the R&D services industry, whose R&D is allocated to purchasing industries. For industries included in line 4 and 5, see the appendix. 1. The Domar weight is calculated as industry gross output relative to market sector value added. 2. Average R&D intensity of industries with µ=1.15. 3. Deflated using the GDP deflator. 4. GVA is for the market sector.
Line 3 summarizes the µ=1.15 R&D intensity of market sector industries. This statistic trails downward, as do the more familiar statistics, R&D relative to GDP or R&D relative to market 22 sector GVA (the memo item on line 8). When the lowest quartile of R&D performers and nonperformers are excluded, however, the average R&D intensity of industries trends up (line 5).
Underlying the divergence is the fact that value added in major R&D-performing industries is falling as a share of total GDP. While this suggests conventional GDP-based science policy benchmarks for R&D are somewhat ill focused, more relevant to this study is the fact that the conventional real R&D spending measure-shown on line 7-grows rather slowly (under 2 percent per year).
To estimate equation (24) we use data in two cross-sections corresponding to the two sub-periods of table 1. The upper panel of figure 1 shows a scatter plot of the 58 µ=1.15 data points that we have available for estimating the regression coefficients. As may be seen, there are notable outliers, and a regression using all of these data points lacks robustness. Nonetheless, the figure confirms that the conduct of UK R&D is concentrated in a handful of industry sectors. It also suggests an underlying linear relationship between total factor productivity and R&D intensity.
The bottom panel of figure 1 shows a plot of the 34 data points that we have after excluding outliers and the bottom quartile of R&D performers. As may be seen the exclusion of the latter mainly reduces the mass (rather than the dispersion) of the data points at low R&D intensities while exclusion of the former appears to sharpen the underlying linear relationship. The bottom panel also distinguishes pre-and post-1995 data points and shows that the lower average industry productivity growth in the post-1995 period appears in industries with very high R&D shares.
Using the dataset plotted in the lower panel, we experimented with estimation technique (fixed versus random effects, OLS versus robust methods) and all methods yielded identical estimates of a and b . We also explored weighted LS (with Domar weights reflecting each industry's contribution to overall productivity) and found it lacked robustness. We then examined the sensitivity of the regression's estimates of  on the value assumed for the innovator markup and tested whether the estimates were stable across sub-periods. This suggests that estimates of  using the constant term from regressions such as equation (24) are unaffected by the assumption for the innovator markup (nor, by the same reasoning, the assumption for ).
The basic point illustrated by columns 1 and 2 of table 2 then is that measured TFP change is an average of a contribution from very substantial productivity growth in the upstream R&D sector In what follows, we examine R&D price change calculated using the estimates shown in both columns 2 and 4, and in the final analysis, we settle on using column 2's constant value for  .
We do this to keep the analysis simple and to present a transparent application of the downstream approach. We also believe additional research and more data points are needed to determine the presence (and size, if present) of a break in UK R&D productivity after 1995. Note--Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Calculating price indexes for R&D
With key parameters specified, we are very close to taking equation (8) to the data. We still need the weights i  to be applied to each industry's estimated price change in the overall price index for R&D-recall that they were left unspecified in section 2-and we need to develop an approach to computation. Dividing by very small industry-level , R Gi s terms as per equation (8) is generally not viable, and most integrated R&D/productivity datasets will have many such terms.
We proceed as follows: We first calculate the numerator of equation (8) 
is the change in the downstream industry's final output price (its gross output price) and
is the change in its share-weighted input costs (labor, capital, and materials). 13 Ignoring time subscripts, for each industry, equation (25) gives ,, ln
the contribution of the change in R&D asset rental prices to the change in industry i's final output price. The overall contribution of the change knowledge asset prices to final output prices is obtained by aggregating these industry-level contributions using Domar weights.
We approximate Domar weights by the ratio of industry gross output () j GO to sector value added () s GVA . The sum of the industry-level contributions is then given by:
where R Y s is the aggregate knowledge capital income share. From (23) R Y s is given by-and calculated as:
13 The source for these items is the March 2008 version of the UK EUKLEMS dataset. We experimented with
directly by subtracting off R&D workers, materials, and capital inputs calculated using data from the BERD survey, but-lacking independent information on input prices--the approach did not yield measures that differed materially from using ,,
(1 ) ln .
The division of equation (26) by equation (27) yields an expression for aggregate R&D price change. The result also reveals three features of the downstream approach. The first concerns its computation. Namely, the change in the R&D asset price can be computed as follows:
i.e., by weighting each industry's contribution by industry gross output relative to aggregate R&D capital income. This does not involve division by very small industry R&D intensities.
The second is that the final price index calculated on the basis of (28) does not depend on assumptions for . Substitution from (23) yields the equivalent expression,
which does not involve the parameter . Although this  -independence result will not hold when industry-specific values for  apply, it nonetheless suggests that pinning down  is not a first order concern when using the downstream approach to construct a price index for R&D.
Finally, a third feature is that further simplification (substitution of P N P N , the industry's share of total R&D investment. Therefore, when equation (29) is used to calculate a price index for R&D, the result is formulaically equivalent to equation (8) The results of proceeding with the above computations are shown in table 3. The first two columns are benchmarks that correspond to two common national accounting practices. The first ascribes all productivity change to the downstream sector, or equivalently, it assumes R&D productivity shows no change. This produces the national accountants' -input-cost‖ price index, and as may be seen in column 1, it increases 4.0 percent per year. This is a faster rate of increase than the 3.5 percent per year change in the UK GDP price index. Table 3 . R&D price change according to assumptions for downstream productivity change ( ln ) .
Column (3) with 1.3
1,2
1,3
(5) The second column shows the result of assuming that the change in operational productivity and R&D productivity are identical, akin to national accountants substituting average measured productivity in market services for -hard-to-measure‖ or nonmarket services, such as R&D. This implies there are neither spillovers from public R&D nor private appropriated returns to investments in product and process innovation. In this scenario, the R&D price index increases 2-1/2 percent per year, less than the input-cost index and similar to the BEA-style R&D weighted output price index shown in column 6.
Columns 3 and 4 show the results of using estimated values for downstream vs. upstream productivity from the regressions the shown in columns 2 and 4 of table 2, respectively. As may be seen, the impact of attributing returns to the conduct of R&D is substantial. The price indexes in columns 3 and 4 fall 7.5 percent and 8.8 percent per year, respectively. The results for subperiods are very sensitive to the shift in the value for theta, however, suggesting that the productivity decomposition parameter is of first order importance to determining the magnitude of R&D price change. By contrast, the results in column 5-where the innovator margin is doubled-suggest rather less sensitivity to this parameter.
In interpreting the estimates shown in columns 3 and 4, note that the overall assumed fraction of measured productivity growth attributed to the conduct of R&D reflects more than the assumption for  that is applied to the upper three quartiles of R&D performing industries. The overall fraction also reflects the ln ln In keeping with our earlier caution against using the literal results of the break-adjusted productivity estimates, our preferred results from table 3 are those in column 3. The annual changes in this index are plotted in the upper panel of figure 2 , along with components of its price dual (price change = cost change -productivity change), where cost change is the input cost of R&D and productivity is a residual including reductions due to innovator markups. The 29 resulting real growth rate of R&D spending is shown in the bottom panel of figure 2 ; it grows 15.6 percent per year in the first period, 9.9 percent in the second, and 12.7 percent per year overall.
The results shown in figure 2 are the central results of this paper. Their sensitivity to the decomposition parameter  is illustrated in produced results for the UK that range from 10 to 70 percent (Hall, Marisee, and Mohen 2009) .
From this perspective, the range of the estimates shown in table 4 is relatively narrow and our central estimate appears rather reasonable.
Implications
We now turn to gauging the importance of our new R&D price index. As depicted so far, the measured economy does not capitalize investments in innovation and track knowledge capital as a macroeconomic statistic. But when national accountants move to recognize R&D spending as investment, in our simple model (a closed economy, now with no intermediates) both aggregate final demand and aggregate industry value added will include the output of the innovation sector.
Under capitalization, real GDP (denoted by Q ) is thus the sum of each sector's output () Q Y N  15 and aggregate productivity is given by
. As may be seen, this differs only slightly from the expression derived for productivity growth without capitalization, equation (22) . 16 The conceptual basis for the similarity in TFP growth before and after capitalization of R&D is, in fact, the premise of this paper-that the impact of the conduct of R&D on productivity is already in measured productivity. By contrast, the capitalization of R&D does produce visible changes in the growth of real output and output per hour because real GDP with our price index for R&D includes a component that is growing 12.7 percent per year.
These propositions are illustrated in table 5, which shows the growth in UK output per hour and TFP before and after capitalization of R&D. As may be seen little or no effect is discerned on in equation (5) of their paper but our derivation is similar.) Substituting our expression for τ, the rate-of-returnapproach regression is seen to yield a coefficient on s Y N that equals gτ, which approaches ρ N as τ approaches one. 15 This of course is a simplified expression as summation in real terms does not hold under chain-weighting. 16 The new trend in measured TFP change will be slightly lower than the rate prior to R&D capitalization because, arithmetically, the first term in equation (30) 
Conclusion
This paper showed that aggregate business output may be modeled as emanating from two sectors: one, the aggregate behavior of business functions devoted to innovation and R&D, and the other, an operations and/or producing sector consisting of all other business functions. The model is very simple, assuming only the following: the innovation sector is entirely upstream of the operations sector; the operations (or -downstream‖) sector produces all final output and is a 17 The stocks are calculated using a depreciation rate of 15 percent (the rate used by the US BEA) and an initial value as in Griliches (1980) . See also equation (3) in Sliker (2007, p. 3).
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price-taker for inputs; and the aggregate value of final output equals the sum of all factor payments by business.
The recursive nature of the model's price-dual relationships was used to show how the price of commercially-produced knowledge is related to innovator market power and downstream output prices, factor costs, and productivity. We related this -downstream‖ approach to measuring R&D price change to other methods under consideration for calculating an investment price index for R&D in national accounts and found that these methods tend to embody unrealistically weak assumptions for R&D productivity (or implausibly strong innovator market power).
The model, its parameterization via productivity decomposition, and use of price-dual solutions have ample precedence in the literature: The model is related both to Romer (1990) and the intangible capital literature (e.g., Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel 2009) ; the productivity decomposition is related to the literature on estimating returns to R&D (e.g., Griliches 1980 , Mansfield 1980 , and Schankerman 1981 ; and price-dual growth accounting relationships were exploited for productivity analysis by Oliner and Sichel (2000) , among others.
When our downstream approach is applied to the UK data, we found that UK R&D investment prices fell 7.5 percent per year from 1985 to 2005, and that R&D capital deepening contributed notably to the growth in output per hour. The precise fall in a R&D price index obtained using the downstream approach depends on a decomposition of measured productivity between a contribution from R&D and from all other factors, but our central finding of falling R&D prices is robust relative to all that we know from the empirical R&D literature (spillovers, above average rates of return, etc.)-and stands in stark contrast to the assumption of rising R&D prices in all other work on the topic. industry because its R&D is allocated to using industries based on input-output relationships.
Figure 1 UK Industry Productivity and R&D Intensity
The lower quartile bound
The allocation of R&D conducted in the R&D services industry to using industries causes three industries that do not conduct scientific R&D according to BERD to show non-zero R&D intensities, albeit very small ones. These industries are financial services, hotels and restaurants, and other social, community and personal services. Then we calculate the cutoff point used to determine the lower quartile of R&D performers, intensities for these nonperformers are excluded from the calculation.
The cutoff point we use is . 
Observations in the productivity regression
To determine the observations used in the productivity decomposition regression, we first exclude the nonperformers and the lower quartile of R&D performers. Then we test for outliers.
We apply the cutoff to each sub-period separately; this procedure leaves us with 38 observations.
We note that two industries that make the cutoff on the basis of averages for the whole period do not make the cutoff in the second sub-period (utilities and miscellaneous business services).
Also, two industries that fail to make the cutoff on the basis of averages for the whole period do make the cutoff in the first period (mining and other manufacturing). Thus after applying the cutoff, our observations consist of 21 observations on the first period and 17 on the second.
Of these 38 observations, the negative observations for computer and software services in the broadcasting and telecommunications industry (NAICS 513), the overstatement of TFP growth due to mis-measured capital is estimated to be about 50 percent of the change based on published data (Corrado 2011) . This type of measurement problem is not covered by the analysis in section 2.4 and, accordingly, the observations are dropped for our regression analysis. All told, the regressions use 34 observations. 
